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ABSTRACT 
 A resilient nation must not only have a strong and functional military for defense, 
but also have the capability to collect tactical intelligence about adversaries to inflict the 
greatest potential damage in potential conflict. Regardless of the size and strength of 
forces, intelligence sharpens the military force’s lethality, ultimately making a nation 
powerful. 
 Fundamentally, intelligence should be unbiased and objective. However, as the 
United States polarizes itself politically today between its two dominant parties, that 
objectivity is at risk. Political bias has been included in U.S. intelligence analysis and 
through a study of two cases, it is apparent that politicized intelligence often negatively 
impacts the intelligence community (IC), the military, and the citizens of the United 
States. 
 The current system of appointing senior intelligence officials inevitably fosters 
politicized intelligence because of an inherent obligation of those appointed to serve the 
administration that selected them. This thesis recommends that to reduce politicization, 
legislation must require IC leaders to have served as intelligence officers first and with 
positional term limits, essentially making them professional, not political, appointments. 
The objective of this legislation would be to maintain the policymaker and IC leadership 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A fundamental principle of intelligence work is that it should be unbiased and 
objective. However, as the United States polarizes itself politically today between its two 
dominant parties, that objectivity may be at risk. This thesis analyzes whether political 
biases have been included in U.S. intelligence analysis and whether such politicization adds 
value to intelligence or undermines the apolitical principles of the Intelligence Community 
(IC). Additionally, this thesis investigates what action the government could take to prevent 
the negative implications of politicized intelligence in the future. In particular, it examines 
three questions. First, is politicized intelligence necessary to support national policy? 
Secondly, has our system for selecting intelligence community leaders led to negative 
politicization in American intelligence? Finally, in order to reduce politicization, should 
intelligence leaders be chosen based on professional experience similar to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS), and should they be given a fixed term like the FBI director?  
B. WHY DOES POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE MATTER? 
A resilient nation must not only have a strong and functional military to defend 
itself, but also the capability to collect strategic, operational and tactical intelligence about 
its adversaries to inflict the greatest potential damage if conflict becomes necessary. 
Regardless of the size and strength of forces, intelligence is the spear that makes a military 
force lethal, ultimately making a nation powerful. However, as Mark Lowenthal adamantly 
argues, politicized intelligence undermines the effectiveness of analysis. He characterizes 
politicized intelligence as “one of the strongest expressions of opprobrium that can be 
leveled in the U.S. intelligence community.”1 Michael Rubin agrees with Lowenthal, and 
adds that politicization is growing today not only in different types but also in quantity.2 
                                                 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 
an imprint of SAGE, 2017), 4. 
2 Michael Rubin, “The Temptation of Intelligence Politicization to Support Diplomacy,” International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 1 (2016): 18, https://doi.org/10.1080/
08850607.2015.1083309. 
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Not only is politicization a problem, but it remains relevant even in the current 
administration. Recently, reports have revealed that President Trump may have influenced 
intelligence by predicting Iran would be in violation of the nuclear agreement vice coming 
to this conclusion based on intelligence analyses.3 Citizens should be concerned as 
bipartisanship in the United States government diminishes and support of party politics and 
administration’s policies supersedes subjective intelligence. 
Even before the current administration was elected, in the recent history of the 
United States, intelligence assessments have often affected diplomatic and military 
decisions; examples include the 2003 Iraq invasion and the fight against the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Politicized intelligence directly affected these campaigns and led 
to policy and intelligence failures. In Iraq, policy drove intelligence demands vice 
intelligence helping shape foreign policy.4 In the case of the fight against ISIL, senior 
military commanders were accused of persuading intelligence analysts to soften their 
estimates to make it appear that their campaigns were more effective than they actually 
were.5 It appears that senior intelligence leadership used biased analysis to support a 
politically palatable foreign policy. Because of politicized intelligence, members of the 
armed forces fought and died in these conflicts while American taxpayers funded their 
efforts. 
Despite the current and other recent administrations being accused of politicizing 
intelligence, it is often the political appointed IC leadership who is accused of this behavior. 
The formal practice of naming political appointees to head American intelligence agencies 
dates back at least to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he selected William Donovan 
as the Coordinator of Information (COI) (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence 
                                                 
3 Julian Borger, “White House ‘Pressuring’ Intelligence Officials to Find Iran in Violation of Nuclear 
Deal,” Guardian, August 28, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/iran-nuclear-deal-
violations-white-house-search-intelligence. 
4 Erik J. Dahl, “Not Your Father’s Intelligence Failure: Why the Intelligence Community Failed to 
Anticipate the Rise of ISIL” (unpublished book chapter), 11. 
5 Dahl, 11. 
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Agency (CIA)) in 1941.6 Although Donovan appears to have served valiantly as the first 
COI, his appointment established the precedent that political appointees would lead the IC. 
It appears that Donovan never used politicized intelligence; however, the establishment of 
IC positions as a political appointment may have made it more likely for politics to 
influence intelligence analysis.  
Not all experts believe that increased politicized intelligence is bad. Some argue 
that politicized intelligence—or at least, policy relevant—can be more useful than 
intelligence that lacks the interest of policymakers. Intelligence scholar Richard Betts, a 
former staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and professor at 
Columbia University, suggests, “The best analysis is useless if those with authority to act 
on it do not use it.”7 Intelligence is just information if it is not policy relevant, and 
information is useless in making policy decisions.  
Although the debate of the causes and effects of politicization is nothing new, one 
possible cause of politicization has not been widely deliberated: the practice of appointing 
IC leaders for political interests or favors rather than appointing individuals based on 
intelligence expertise, experience and ability. Little attention has been devoted to 
addressing the problem that senior intelligence leaders may inject their political opinions 
in analysis to conform to an administration’s policy.  
C. THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTIONS 
The research question proposed contains three distinct questions that are worth 
deliberating. First, have political biases been included in intelligence analysis or briefings, 
and does politicization add value to the intelligence, or does it undermine the apolitical 
principles of the IC? Secondly, has the system for selecting IC leaders contributed to 
politicization in American intelligence? Finally, what action could the government take to 
prevent the negative implications of politicized intelligence in the future? 
                                                 
6 “COI Came First,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 28, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/intelligence-history/oss/art02.htm. 
7 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 67. 
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The first question is the basis of the overall argument. If politicized intelligence has 
not occurred in the history of the United States, then this thesis would have been irrelevant. 
However, the literature overall suggests that politicized intelligence has occurred, despite 
experts having mixed views as to whether the influence of politicized intelligence has a 
positive or negative effect on policy. Politicized intelligence may give policymakers 
substance and context that can be impactful to aid the decision making process. 
Nevertheless, if the intelligence becomes partial to policy preferences, it could 
misrepresent the intelligence and cause intelligence failures. This thesis argues that 
although politicized intelligence appears to get the attention of policymakers, it undermines 
the principal foundation of the IC’s apolitical nature. 
The second question in this thesis expands on the previous inquiry. Has the system 
for selecting IC leaders contributed to negative politicization in American intelligence? 
Politicized intelligence is inevitable within the current system of appointing senior 
intelligence officials because there is an inherent obligation of those appointed to 
leadership positions to serve the administration that appointed them. This thesis explores 
options to alleviate this dilemma by arguing that if the United States government wishes to 
increase the trust and the integrity the public has for the United States IC, it should change 
the way in which senior intelligence officials are appointed.  
The final question in this thesis is what action the government could take to prevent 
the negative implications of politicized intelligence in the future. The hypothesis is that 
there needs to be a greater separation between the producers and consumers of intelligence. 
When these two groups are interconnected, it can lead consumers to dictate what the 
producers should infer through their analysis, vice the producers generating the intelligence 
for consumers to better inform policymakers in their decision making. This can often be 
unintentional; however, it is still contrary to the fundamental principle of intelligence 
remaining apolitical and without bias. Experts in the field point to this as a critical way to 
prevent the mixture of politics and intelligence, and the current system appears to allow 
this solution to persist. 
There are two characteristics of appointments to consider when looking for optimal 
solutions to politicized intelligence. The first consideration is whether appointees are 
 5 
professional or political appointments. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the 
appointment of career politicians or supporters of administrations to intelligence leadership 
roles should be restricted when they have little intelligence experience. Intelligence officers 
promoted from within the agency they serve will be better suited to lead their organizations 
without the influence of political biases. These leaders can ensure evidence based analysis 
is used to make better policies and educated decisions.  
The second aspect of appointments to consider is the implementation of a term 
limit. An effective model for future IC appointments might be based in part on the system 
used to appoint members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are selected on the basis of their 
professional knowledge and experience, and on the system used to appoint the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Board of Governors in the Federal Reserve 
System, who serve with term limits.8 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis accomplishes three objectives. First, it proves political views have been 
included in intelligence analysis and that those views undermine the apolitical principles 
of the IC. Secondly, it determines that the lack of professional expertise as a criteria for 
selecting IC leaders contributes to politicization in American intelligence. Finally, it 
evaluates what action the government could take to prevent the negative implications of 
politicized intelligence in the future. 
To assess whether political views have been included in intelligence analysis and 
their impact on policy, this thesis studies two recent intelligence and policy failures. The 
sources used in understanding the foundations of politicized intelligence are scholars who 
have backgrounds in the field and others who are well known authors within the 
intelligence domain. These leaders of their field offer opposing views as to whether or not 
politicized intelligence is advantageous or disastrous. Through these case studies, evidence 
proves biases influenced the analysis and dissemination of intelligence having catastrophic 
effects on foreign policy and military action. 
                                                 
8 Paul Charles Light, A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to 
Reverse It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 224. 
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To determine if the system for selecting IC leaders contributed to an increase in 
detrimental politicization, this thesis first studies the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction 
case. The supporting documentation used in this study originates from the work of Paul 
Pillar, Joshua Rovner, Ron Suskind, and Melvin Goodman.9 This study determines 
politicized intelligence led to the intelligence failure and political appointments of 
intelligence leaders further influenced the politicization of analysis.  
Next, this thesis conducts a second case study of Central Command and its inability 
to adequately assess the rising ISIS threat. The evidence used in this case study primarily 
comes from Dr. Erik Dahl’s work, Not Your Father’s Intelligence Failure: Why the IC 
Failed to Anticipate the Rise of ISIL supplemented by the Initial Findings of the U.S. House 
of Representatives Joint Task Force and the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector 
General’s Unclassified Report of Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM 
Intelligence Products. Additional sources used are Mark Mazzetti’s and Matt Apuzzo’s 
article “Military Analyst Again Raises Red Flags on Progress in Iraq,” Shane Harris’s and 
Nancy A. Youssef’s article on the manipulation of ISIS intelligence, and Deb Riechmann, 
Paul McLeary, and Dan De Luce’s work on reporting intelligence obstructions within the 
Pentagon.10 This analysis proves that the IC’s professional training ensures there is a 
                                                 
9 Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008), 257; Ron Suskind, “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush,” New York 
Times, October 17, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-
presidency-of-george-w-bush.html; “The Record on CURVEBALL,” The National Security Archive, 
accessed June 03, 2017, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB234/; Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and 
U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); 
Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2015). 
10 The U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence Analysis, 
Initial Findings of the U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence 
Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2016), https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/house_jtf_on_centcom_intelligence_initial_report.pdf; Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, 
“Military Analyst Again Raises Red Flags on Progress in Iraq,” New York Times, September 23, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/world/military-analyst-again-raises-red-flags-on-progress-in-iraq.html; 
Shane Harris and Nancy A. Youssef, “50 Spies Say ISIS Intelligence Was Cooked,” The Daily Beast, 
September 9, 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/09/exclusive-50-spies-say-isis-intelligence-was-
cooked.html; Deb Riechmann, “House Chairman: Military Files, Emails Deleted Amid Probe,” Business 
Insider, February 25, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-house-chairman-military-files-emails-deleted-
amid-probe-2016-2; Paul McLeary and Dan De Luce, “Top House Lawmaker Accuses Pentagon of 
Obstructing Intel Probe,” Foreign Policy, February 26, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/26/exclusive-
top-house-lawmaker-accuses-pentagon-of-obstructing-intel-probe/.  
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separation of bias from analysis. Specifically, it identifies that nonmilitary analysts blew 
the whistle and reported politicized intelligence because of their training and professional 
conduct. From this case study, it is easy to recognize how professional appointments could 
serve more effectively as leaders of the IC. 
Finally, and most importantly, this thesis compares other government professions 
to determine whether political appointees or professional appointees better serve the 
citizens and the President of the United States. A comprehensive study of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Board of Governors in the Federal 
Reserve System, and the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) 
director is used to determine which method of selecting senior officials would be most 
effective to use in a reform recommendation for the IC. The research finds professionals 
appointed in their field are superior to political appointees, and a term limit aids in the 
success of appointees. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter II 
consists of background information and a detailed literature review. Chapter III consists of 
two case studies. First is an analysis of an intelligence failure suspected to be a 
politicization intelligence failure in the study of the Iraq WMD incident. The ISIS case in 
comparison appears uninfluenced by politics but was rather a manipulation of the perceived 
threat in Central Command, which lead to a major failure. Chapter 4 discusses the history 
of the appointment process in the IC and examines the process of selecting political and 
professional appointments of other government professions, allowing for a comparison of 
effectiveness in relation to IC appointees. The final chapter is a conclusion of the thesis 
research and answers the three questions posed in the problem statement. 
  
 8 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The subject of politicized intelligence is highly debated among scholars who study 
the IC. Some scholars claim that without a political context, and a close relationship 
between senior intelligence officials and the President, policymakers ignore intelligence 
because it is tactically insignificant and lacks policy value. Other scholars suggest politics 
and intelligence are “like oil and vinegar”; they do not and should never mix because they 
may cause policy to drive intelligence vice intelligence influencing policy.11 This literature 
review provides three frameworks for analysis when reviewing politicized intelligence. 
The first section uses current scholarly work to investigate definitions and clarify what 
exactly politicized intelligence is and is not. Next is a study of both arguments for and 
against the politicization of intelligence. The literature review concludes with an 
examination of the suggested solutions to prevent politicized intelligence in the future. 
A. POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE DEFINED 
It is important to understand politicized intelligence first before determining if it 
has affected the United States IC. This section discusses how different experts have defined 
and characterized politicization. There are three widely accepted definitions along with 
three different frameworks for considering politicized intelligence 
Former U.S. National Intelligence Council Director and Professor Gregory F. 
Treverton provides the first definition of politicized intelligence. His definition is the most 
succinct and detailed. Treverton states politicized intelligence is a “commitment to 
perspectives or conclusions, in the process of intelligence analysis or interaction with 
policy, that suppress other evidence or views, or blind people to them.”12 For further 
analysis, Treverton provides a detailed categorization of politicized intelligence into five 
classifications in his book Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. 
                                                 
11 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4. 
12 Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘Politicization’ and Irrelevance,” in 
Analyzing Intelligence Origins, Obstacles and Innovations, ed. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 93. 
 10 
The first type he designates is direct pressure, defined as “senior policy officials [coming] 
to particular intelligence conclusions, usually ones that accord with those officials’ policies 
or policy preferences.”13 An example of this type of influence would be if the president 
directed a senior analyst or official to find or lose information to affect the resulting report.  
The second category of politicized intelligence is “house line” bias, which ignores 
any information that counters a predetermined view or position.14 As stated in the 
introduction to this thesis, increased political polarization in the United States today makes 
this type of politicized intelligence a major issue for the IC. As a former CIA analyst argues, 
the Trump administration’s former Chief Strategist Steve Bannon was exerting an 
unprecedented influence over the intelligence arm of government which he believed is 
extremely dangerous.15 Other scholars believe the Trump administration has attempted to 
influence analyses to justify their policies and the policies of Republican Party.16 Sticking 
to party lines can not only cause issues in the legislative branch of government but, as 
evidenced by Treverton’s argument, can also undermine the apolitical nature of analyses 
in the IC. 
The next type of politicized intelligence is “cherry picking.” An example of cherry 
picking would be if policymakers looked at an array of analyses and picked which ones 
best support their agenda and ignored the analyses that gave opposing views despite being 
factually based.17 The most often violators of cherry picking are usually policy officials 
within the executive branch of government; analysts are not exerting bias but rather leaders 
well above their pay grade.18  
                                                 
13 Treverton, 93. 
14 Treverton, 93. 
15 Nada Bakos, Politicization of the Intelligence Community is Extremely Dangerous (Philadelphia, 
PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 17, 2017), https://www.fpri.org/2017/02/politicization-
intelligence-community-extremely-dangerous/. 
16 Julian Borger, “White House ‘Pressuring’ Intelligence Officials to Find Iran in Violation of Nuclear 
Deal,” The Guardian, August 28, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/iran-nuclear-
deal-violations-white-house-search-intelligence. 
17 Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis,” 93. 
18 Treverton, 93. 
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The fourth type of politicized intelligence is question asking. Treverton defines 
question asking as “where, as in other areas of inquiry, the nature of the question takes the 
analysis a good way [punctuation mark here?] if not to the answer, then to the frame in 
which the answer will lie.”19 This type of politicization is an integral piece of the analyses 
in Chapter III, specifically in the Iraq WMD case. Question asking can often skew or 
eliminate important pieces of information in analysis, leading some to view a situation 
more optimistically. 
Treverton’s final category of politicized intelligence is the shared mindset. The 
shared mindset is similar to the idea of group-based thinking (groupthink) but expands to 
encompass both the intelligence and policy aspects of analyses.20 Usually, the shared 
mindset type of politicized intelligence is not intentional but rather self-imposed 
subconsciously.21 Although groupthink may not be intentional, it can have a devastating 
impact on the integrity of facts in analysis. 
Other authors provide different perspectives when categorizing politicized 
intelligence into two main types. Glenn Hastedt, an author and professor in the Justice 
Studies Department at James Madison University, breaks politicized intelligence into two 
categories: soft and hard politicization.22 He describes soft politicization as “alter[ing] the 
assumptions underlying an analysis, the decision rules by which an analysis moves 
forward, and the institutional setting within which these deliberations occur.”23 Hastedt 
proposes that by applying soft politicization on assumptions, intelligence becomes valuable 
when it may not have been considered, discussed, or acted upon before. Soft politicization 
does not change the information gathered but only contextualizes it for the consumer. 
                                                 
19 Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis,” 93. 
20 Treverton, 94. 
21 Treverton, 94. 
22 Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American 
Experience,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 10, https://doi.org/10.1080/
02684527.2012.749062. 
23 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 10. 
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Conversely, Hastedt defines hard politicization as “deliberate attempts to coerce 
analysts into adopting a certain set of assumptions or conclusion or in the extreme, 
overruling analysts and imposing a conclusion on the analysis.”24 An example of hard 
politicization was the estimated impact the United States IC made based on the assumption 
that the Iraqi regime possessed nuclear weapons. In this example, administration officials 
guided analyses to the desired estimate, despite not having evidence to support the 
assumption that Iraq had nuclear weapons. The analysis, although valid, was based on 
information that has not been proven accurate and was erroneously used to justify the 
invasion of a sovereign nation.  
It is clear that Hastedt sees a vast difference between hard and soft politicization. 
He asserts hard politicization by both the producers and consumers of intelligence is not 
tolerable because it undermines fact based analyses and imposes fictional alternative 
conclusions. Hastedt describes the issues of both defining and classifying politicized 
intelligence.25 In his opinion, splitting the issue into two distinct groups allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding vice Treverton’s five-step approach to compartmentalizing 
politicized intelligence. As a result, this construct of politicized intelligence may be easier 
to describe and categorize but is insufficient because it lacks the detail that Treverton’s 
approach provides. 
In his book Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rover depicts a similar definition as Hastedt 
and Treverton but diverges from the other scholars by describing politicized intelligence 
by its effects rather than its category or type. Rover states “politicization [is] defined as the 
attempt to manipulate intelligence so that it reflects policy preferences.”26 Moreover, he 
believes that although politicization negatively affects intelligence, there may not be a 
solution to absolve the problem.27 Rover does break down politicization into two distinct 
types comparable to Hastedt: direct and indirect politicization. Rover asserts that direct 
                                                 
24 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 10. 
25 Hastedt, 5–6. 
26Rovner, Fixing the Facts, 5. 
27 Rovner, 203. 
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politicization is when leaders change factual evidence in analysis, and indirect 
politicization is usually a subtle signal to direct the IC to a policy preference.28 Again, just 
like Hastedt, Rover’s categorization may be easier to describe but is insufficient because it 
lacks the detail that Treverton’s approach provides. 
Overall, all three authors agree that there are different methods to politically 
influence intelligence. They each define politicized intelligence in different ways, some 
direct and others more complicated. However, not all the authors believe politicized 
intelligence is useless; in fact, some believe soft politicization can help policymakers make 
informed decisions. Among the authors who provide frameworks to compartmentalize 
types of politicized intelligence, Treverton contributes the most robust and comprehensive 
five-part explanation and analysis. His five part definition breaks down politicization into 
direct pressure, house lines, cherry picking information, question asking, and shared 
mindset or “groupthink,” which are used to analyze the case studies examined in this thesis. 
The next two sections of this Chapter discuss how the experts on the subject view 
politicization and the relationship between the consumers and producers of intelligence. 
B. POLITICS AND INTELLIGENCE: LIKE OIL AND VINEGAR 
The majority of scholars who study politicized intelligence adamantly argue that 
politicized intelligence undermines the effectiveness of analysis. As noted earlier, Mark 
Lowenthal characterizes politicized intelligence as “one of the strongest expressions of 
opprobrium that can leveled in the U.S. IC.”29 Political opinions and intelligence analysis, 
in Lowenthal’s opinion, are “like oil and vinegar”; they do not and should not mix and 
should therefore be intentionally kept separate.30 U.S. intelligence agencies, according to 
Lowenthal, draw a hard line between intelligence analysis and policies adopted based on 
that analysis.31 Intelligence officials presenting strong policy preferences in analyses can 
                                                 
28 Rovner, 5. 
29 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 
an imprint of SAGE, 2017), 4. 
30 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 4. 
31 Lowenthal, 4. 
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cause policy makers to question the objectivity of the intelligence they receive. For that 
reason, Lowenthal writes, intelligence officers cannot and should not present opinions or 
preferences when it comes to choices in policy.32 Lowenthal also provides a visual 
representation of the ideal relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence 
as seen in Figure 1, where policy can clearly impact intelligence requirements and provide 
feedback to the IC, but the IC cannot affect policy. The CIA, as an example, was organized 
and developed specifically as a non-departmental agency to avoid being susceptible to 
policy goals.33 
                                                 
32 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 5. 
33 Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 119. 
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Figure 1.  The Great Divide between Policy and Intelligence34 
Jennifer E. Sims, the author of Transforming U.S. Intelligence, agrees with 
Lowenthal and staunchly opposes politicized intelligence. In her opinion, the competitive 
use of intelligence by IC officials to affect policy often leads to politicized intelligence. 
Intel officers want to be relevant, and aiding policymakers can lead them to form analyses 
in concert with the perceived policy preferences of the administration they work for. Sims 
states, “Policymakers compete for influence, seek to use intelligence to gain leverage, and 
have an interest in keeping competitors in the policy process from using intelligence to 
eclipse their own roles.”35 This adds to what Hastedt notes, that “the long-developing trend 
                                                 
34 Source: Lowenthal, Intelligence, 6. Lowenthal provides the diagram to illustrate what should be 
conceived of as a dividing line between policy and intelligence, where only policy can permeate thought 
the boundary to influence intelligence and not vice versa. 
35 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber, Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, WA: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 41. 
 16 
is the end of bipartisanship and a sustaining and guiding concept in the conduct of national 
security policy.”36 Sims argues that not only is politicization corrupt, but it is also a product 
of the polarization of party politics in the United States as a whole. 
Mark Jensen also agrees that politicization has a negative impact and often leads to 
failures. He adds that “Politicization, the practice of intelligence professionals bending 
intelligence to meet decision-maker needs or decision makers focusing on selected 
intelligence products or passages thereof for their own political purposes, is unacceptable, 
but unfortunately still occurs.”37 Despite awareness by both producers and consumers of 
intelligence, politicization still happens and negatively impacts the public’s support and 
rapport of the intelligence community and policymakers. 
From the literature reviewed in this section, the use of politicized intelligence 
misleads the government and the public, often drawing their attention away from important 
intelligence issues. Most authors with prior experience in the IC argue against the use of 
politicized intelligence; however, using politicized intelligence when necessary to draw the 
attention of policy makers can be an effective measure to promote action and ensure 
analysis. When policy makers use the distorted truth to support action, on the other hand, 
politicized intelligence can be dangerous.  
C. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE 
Politicized intelligence may not always be negative. The objective of intelligence 
is to inform consumers and policymakers so that they can make decisions based on analysis 
that was previously unavailable. Experts suggest intelligence is just information if there is 
no substance or importance, and it is therefore useless in making policy decisions. Betts, 
in his book Enemies of Intelligence, argues that politicized intelligence is not always bad, 
and states “it is a complicated phenomenon which in a few limited respects offers benefits 
                                                 
36 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 7. 
37 Mark A. Jensen, “Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?,” 
Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 2 (2012): 265, https://doi.org/101080/02684527.2012.661646. 
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as well as costs.”38 Politicized intelligence, which “suppresses or distorts the truth to 
promote a political agenda,” can be bad, but if the politicization makes the intelligence 
seem more relevant and policy makers are less likely to dismiss the information, it can be 
extremely advantageous.39 Policy makers may need context in analysis to understand how 
their decisions may influence the situation. Intelligence, even if it requires some 
politicization, should not reflect interests, preferences, or decisions but rather should assess 
the way decisions may affect policymakers’ concerns.40  
Other authors take a similar view as Betts. In his article “The Politics of Intelligence 
and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience,” Hastedt claims, 
“politicizing an issue is not by definition corrupting it. It is value neutral strategy. It says 
nothing about the agenda of those employing it.”41 Hastedt believes adding a political spin 
to intelligence can give it a purpose. Josh Rover offers a similar suggestion to Hastedt in 
his article “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing” but is less tolerant of politicized 
intelligence. He states, “Politicization can be a good thing, or at least a necessary risk.”42 
Rover, although a staunch critic of politicized intelligence, sees the value in politicizing 
intelligence if it is the difference between being isolated from policymakers or being a 
possible influence over policymakers.43 
Generally, the literature on politicized intelligence is critical of politicization, looks 
down heavily on the topic, and considers it a manipulation of facts. As one can ascertain 
from the authors above, however, some experts see benefits from politicizing intelligence 
products. There are circumstances when politicized intelligence transforms information, 
                                                 
38 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 67. 
39 Douglas A. Borer, Stephen Twing, and Randy P. Burkett, “Problems in the Intelligence-Policy 
Nexus: Rethinking Korea, Tet, and Afghanistan,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 6 (2013): 815, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851875 
40 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 75. 
41 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 10.  
42 Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 
(2013): 56, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.749065 
43 Rovner, 56. 
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which would be useless otherwise, into relevant analyses for use in the decision making 
process. 
D. SOLUTIONS TO THE POLITICIZATION PROBLEM 
Reform can have a negative connotation in government, specifically in the IC, 
because it often adds bureaucracy to an already extremely bureaucratic organization. 
However, in the case of the politicization of intelligence it might be needed to fix an age 
old problem. As the first Director of the CIA (DCIA) Robert Gates noted in an address to 
the CIA in 1992, “the problem of politicization is as old as the intelligence business,” and 
it will not go away anytime soon.44 Critics charge that not only has politicized intelligence 
in the Iraq WMD case cost the lives of some 4,000 U.S. service members, but it has also 
cost an estimated 1.7 trillion dollars.45 The evaluation of the mistakes of the past can 
prevent them from occurring again in the future; nevertheless, politicized intelligence is 
consistent and will only get worse without major reforms.46 Upon reviewing the literature 
on the subject, there is not a copious amount of proposals to reform the IC to prevent 
politicized intelligence. Some scholars within the field do provide solutions, and despite 
their simplicity, they may effect change. 
Most often, experts suggest that there is a need for more separation between the 
producers and the consumers of intelligence. Mark Lowenthal argues the separation 
between these two entities is critical to reduce the risk of Treverton’s five types of 
politicized intelligence.47 To avoid political influence and analyses corruption, it is 
paramount to limit interactions between analysts and policy makers when discussing 
intelligence.  
44 Robert Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization,” Central Intelligence Agency, August 04, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/html/
v36i1a01p_0001.htm. 
45 Dennis Gleeson, “The High Cost of Politicizing Intelligence,” The Atlantic, February 25, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/the-high-cost-of-politicizing-intelligence/517854/. 
46 David S. Cohen, “Opinion | Trump is Trying to Politicize Intelligence to Support his Iran Policy. 
That’s Dangerous.,” Washington Post, August 04, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-
is-trying-to-politicize-intelligence-to-support-his-iran-policy-thats-dangerous/2017/08/04/ffb192e0-77b6-
11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?utm_term=.568b45a4851e. 
47 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 18. 
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Other authors suggest that the separation between producers and consumers may 
be too drastic. Daniel Byman, Professor and Senior Associate Dean for Undergraduate 
Affairs at Georgetown University, contends that specialized courses for policymakers may 
make them more effective consumers of information and limit the pressure politicians place 
on intelligence leaders and analysts.48 Not only could these courses provide policymakers 
with a basic knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence, but it would also 
help level their expectations of the IC. 
Still, Paul Pillar has another view. Pillar is a prolific author in the intelligence field 
and is a retired CIA analyst and professor at Georgetown University. He argues that 
political appointments only add bureaucratic layers of filtration from original analysis from 
producers to the consumer.49 This layer of filtration allows analyses to change at every 
level without the initial author ever realizing it, sometimes even leading to politicization at 
the highest levels of the IC.  
Pillar recommends that policymakers should “adapt to the uncertainty” of 
intelligence and have an open mind that intelligence does not always predict exactly what 
will happen in the future.50 Pillar continues by offering that reducing political 
appointments to senior IC positions would not only eliminate a layer of bias between the 
producer and the consumer of intelligence in the federal government, allowing political 
agendas to be curtailed, but it would also open opportunities for career employees to seek 
the highest office in their profession.51  
48 Daniel Byman, “Intelligence and Its Critics,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 3 (2016): 274, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1108086. 
49 Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 326; Georgetown University, https://explore.georgetown.edu/people/
prp8/.; Paul Charles Light, A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to 
Reverse It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 224; Stephen B. Slick, “Comment on 
Presidential Intelligence,” Harvard Law Review, January 11, 2016, https://harvardlawreview.org/2016/01/
comment-on-presidential-intelligence/. 
50 Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 337. 
51 Pillar, 337. 
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General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (ret), shares the opinion of Pillar that professionals 
should hold the most senior positions in the IC. In his hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence for reform of the IC, he stated: 
The President’s chief military advisor is a military professional, standing at 
the very top of the entire profession of arms. We put only professionals in 
that position, and in fact our law requires that only one who has served as a 
service chief, vice chairman or commander of a unified or specified 
command can hold the position. Not so for the person who stands at the top 
of the intelligence profession and serves as the principal adviser to the 
president for intelligence.… Those who serve at the pleasure of a President 
for an expected term limited to his, who comes to office precisely because 
of a shared politics and political reliability, come, I should think, under 
enormous pressure or temptation to give the President what he wants rather 
what he doesn’t want, but needs. When that servant is responsible for 
selecting the intelligence analysis to give his President, I think I’d prefer a 
professional to a political appointee with as much independence and job 
security as possible.52 
While Boyd prefers professional appointments over political appointments in key 
Presidential advisor roles, other appointments pose other issues in the executive branch. 
Presidential scholar Paul Charles Light also agrees with Pillar and has written that 
new presidents face significant problems in nominating and getting their senior agency and 
cabinet leaders approved.53 The problem could be avoidable if most senior IC leaders were 
professionals and reappointment with each new presidential administration was not 
necessary. Ultimately, this would allow the IC agencies to work more efficiently during 
Presidential transitions vice having drastic changes in leadership every four years. 
Pillar, to support his solution, offers pros and cons to reducing political 
appointments. He suggests that reducing political appointments would “facilitate the 
flowing of insights and information to top policymakers without being filtered through 
appointees with their own agendas.”54 Pillar also identifies counter arguments to reducing 
                                                 
52 Reform of the United States Intelligence Community: Hearings Before the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 118 Cong. 2 (2004), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/
108835.pdf. 
53 Light, A Government Ill Executed, 224. 
54 Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 326. 
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appointments. Eliminating these positions has three potential consequences. First, it 
removes/erases/etc., the ability to have new perspectives after each new election.55 In 
addition, it takes away the ability of the president to appoint political allies who aid their 
political campaign as a reward.56 The final consequence of eliminating appointees is that 
the administration may lose the ability to ensure senior management supports their policies 
and preferences.57 After identifying these tradeoffs, Pillar states that these reasons are 
exactly why reducing appointments would also reduce the politicization of intelligence.58 
Appointments as rewards for campaign aid or political support only fosters an environment 
that would tolerate political biases in intelligence vice a strictly analytical approach. This 
bias of policies and preferences undermines the ability to debate and see other arguments 
and evidence that support different solutions to foreign and domestic politics.59 
James Dobbins, the Director of the International Security and Defense Policy 
Center at the RAND Corporation and former Assistant Secretary of State under Presidents 
Clinton and Bush, adds to Pillar’s final point about the necessity of debate within the IC. 
He proclaims, “Americans should insist on leaders who will foster debate and welcome 
disciplined dissent. These leaders should be surrounded by advisers chosen primarily for 
their relevant experience and demonstrated competence, not their ideological purity and 
partisan loyalty.”60 The idea of removing political appointees from government is not a 
task taken lightly and will likely face tremendous opposition.61 Regardless of political 
parties, it is difficult to imagine a president would support such an idea to surround him or 
herself with advisers who may not be like-minded, but it may be the only way to reduce 
the growing amount of politicization within the IC. 
                                                 





60 James Dobbins, “Who Lost Iraq?,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2007-09-01/who-lost-iraq. 
61 Light, A Government Ill Executed, 224.  
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In stark contradiction to Pillar and Dobbins, Samuel J. Rascoff, in a Harvard Law 
Review article on “Presidential Intelligence,” discusses the fact that despite political 
appointments, intelligence agencies “have successfully resisted politicization.”62 
Currently, less than 20 political appointments are Senate-confirmed in the IC.63 The 
Director of the FBI also has a limited term to avoid political influence on intelligence 
affairs, and there have been calls to expand the term limits to the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) position. From Rascoff’s perspective, “an increase in the number of 
presidential appointees would foster greater attentiveness to the President’s policies” and 
reduce the “misused or not used at all” of analyses.64 Rascoff believes that the appointees 
serve at the pleasure of the President and therefore must have his or her political agenda on 
their minds. 
In contrast, Stephen Slick, in a response to Rascoff’s article, presents a counter 
argument to the subjectivity of political appointments, stating, 
The IC’s most valuable asset is, in fact, a carefully cultivated reputation for 
providing objective nonpartisan information and judgments. The presence 
within intelligence agencies of large numbers of non-professionals who owe 
their current jobs (and future career prospects) to the electoral success of a 
political party is, at best, a source of bias and, at worst, and invitation to 
corruption.65 
Slick agrees with Pillar that non-professionals only foster an environment where biases can 
exist. He also adds that political appointments cultivate an intolerable environment of 
politicized intelligence. Assuming, although not directly stated, that Slick would agree with 
Pillar, Dobbins, and Light in that the change in the appointment process would only help 
eliminate the negative implications of politicized intelligence. 
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Overall, the reforms to intelligence suggested, with the exception of eliminating or 
reducing political appointments, are rudimentary, and it is difficult to determine if they will 
succeed. Reducing political appointments, however, may be a change that has little traction 
in the literature but seems to be the most effective solution to the problem proposed in this 
thesis. The change, as Pillar suggests, to the political appointments will not be a trivial task 
and will likely require legal change and congressional approval. Nonetheless, if it is not 
carefully considered and analyzed, it could cause the best solution to be overlooked.66 
E. CONCLUSION 
Within the academic field of intelligence studies, there is a plethora of literature on 
intelligence success and failures. More specifically, there is quite a debate, as depicted 
above, on the use of politicization in the analysis and the briefing of intelligence. There are 
authors who believe less aggressive politicization, referred to as soft politicization, is 
necessary in circumstances to catch the eye of the consumer. Others provide a contrasting 
view and believe that in no way should politics and intelligence encompass one another, 
and none of the scholars have come to a consensus regarding reform. This literature review 
has not only defined politicization but has also provided the basis for both sides of the 
politicization argument. The next chapter, using the definitions and the foundations of the 
debate discussed here, analyzes two case studies to determine if politicized intelligence 
helps or hinders policymakers in their decisions in foreign relations and national security.  
  
                                                 
66 Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 326. 
 24 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 25 
III. CASES OF POLITICIZATION 
The politicization of intelligence can be either positive or negative depending on 
the author or official one reads or discusses the issue with. Some pose the question: does 
politicized intelligence really matter if it has not caused intelligence failures? It appears, 
however, that the politicization of intelligence has caused recent and significant 
intelligence failures and may have even influenced the decision to declare an offensive war 
in a sovereign nation.67  
The previous chapter discussed the current debate in the literature over the 
definition, the effects, and the possible solutions to the politicization of intelligence. This 
chapter adds to that discussion and argues that politicization not only exists but also causes 
serious damage to U.S. national interests; in the Iraq case, it led to a war that continues 14 
years later after 4,000 American casualties and over 100,000 Iraqi casualties.68 This case 
study, using Gregory Treverton’s five-part definition of politicized intelligence, proves that 
politicization did in fact occur and that it was harmful to national interests.  
The second portion of this chapter looks at the ISIS Central Command Estimates 
case to prove that politicized intelligence does not always originate from the IC but that 
politics can also influence military intelligence. In the ISIS case, estimates were purposely 
misleading in order to portray a more appealing assessment of the threat vulnerability.69 
This case when compared to the Iraq case proves that politicized intelligence happens often 
for different reasons and has a devastating impact on national security. Additionally, this 
case proves civilian professionals are also more likely to blow the whistle when 
politicization occurs because of their understanding of the implications and because of the 
ethos and values of unbiased intelligence. 
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A. THE FOUR OF THE FIVE TYPES OF POLITICIZATION USED IN THE 
IRAQ WMD CASE 
On May 6, 1997, in a hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence for his 
nomination to be Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet proclaimed under his 
leadership that the CIA would provide intelligence that was “clear and objective” to all 
those who depended on the Nation’s intelligence.70 However, despite Tenet’s testimony, 
it is evident that in the Iraq WMD case the Bush administration influenced the analyses 
and lacked objectivity. As seen in Figure 2, not only did the administration and the IC have 
a close working relationship, but they also sat closely together at the United Nations 
Security Council in 2003. The invasion of Iraq is a failure of both the practice of guarding 
the IC from political interaction and a failure of the proper use of sources and methods by 
taking action based on poorly vetted and single-source uncorroborated intelligence. The 
administration influenced the intelligence analyses using four of the five politicized 
intelligence types described by Treverton in his chapter of Analyzing Intelligence.71 
Although both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
claimed politicization did not occur in the Iraq WMD case, there is ample evidence to 
support the contrary.72 
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Figure 2.  Director Tenet and Secretary of State Colin Powell Getting Too 
Close at the UN.73 
There are many definitions of politicization; however, Treverton’s five-part 
definition breaks down politicization into direct pressure, house lines, cherry picking 
information, question asking, and groupthink and is most useful in determining if 
politicization has occurred. Since Treverton’s definition is so effective, it will be used in 
both case studies to determine if intelligence was politicized. 
                                                 
73 Source: “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council,” National 
Archives and Records Administration, February 03, 2003, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html. Image shows the closeness of the Director Tenet to the 
Administration as Secretary of State Colin Powell briefs the WMD evidence during his address to the 
United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, in New York City. One can imagine that Tenet’s 
presence at this meeting had an effect on the council in that it showed that the intelligence community 
supported the executive branch and backed it intelligence fully. This may have convinced some UN leaders 
that, despite the ambiguity in the information, the head of the IC was willing to put his name and face on 
the evidence and testimony presented by Colin Powell. 
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There were two reasons the Bush administration used intelligence to justify that 
war was the best option for intervening in Iraq. The first reason was that Saddam Hussein 
was working to develop and may already have developed WMDs. The second reason was 
that it appeared he had ties to al Qaeda, a terrorist network and enemy of the United States. 
The Bush administration used politicized intelligence in an effort to prove that these two 
motivations for war were facts. This section of the chapter breaks down each of the four 
types of politicization used by the Bush administration through the justifications for war 
and study how it affected overall policy. 
1. Direct Pressure 
Direct pressure in the Iraq WMD case appears to have come from two sources, first 
the Vice President Dick Cheney and secondly from the administration’s policy preferences. 
According to Treverton, direct pressure is when, “senior policy officials [coming] to 
particular intelligence conclusions, usually ones that accord with those officials’ policies 
or policy preferences.”74 The evidence of direct pressure is quite clear. 
Rovner’s book, Fixing the Facts, illuminates the first source of direct pressure by 
Dick Cheney. Rovner claims that the Vice President’s frequent trips to CIA headquarters 
in Langley, VA gave the appearance that the administration was not happy with the 
conclusions analysts were drawing in the intelligence gathered on Iraq.75 Some officials 
even felt as though “signals intended or otherwise, that a certain output was desired.”76 
Direct pressure does not require a policymaker to publish their demands of the IC but rather 
to just assert their displeasure with the current analysis or direct analysis to a certain 
conclusion in line with the policy objects. Through firsthand accounts, it is clear that the 
Vice President tried to affect the CIA’s products. 
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The second influence of direct pressure in the Iraq WMD case was that the 
administration had already made the decision to go to Iraq before intelligence supported that 
conclusion. Paul O’Neill, the former Secretary of the Treasury under the Bush 
administration, discussed the president’s influence over intelligence analysis when he stated, 
“if you operate in a certain way—by saying this is how I want to justify what I have already 
decided to do, and I don’t care how you pull it off—you guarantee that you’ll get faulty, one-
sided information.”77 Secretary O’Neill also stated that not only did the United States enter 
the Iraq War primarily based on single-source intelligence but also that the administration 
decided to go to war before the faulty intelligence was even discovered.78 It appears through 
another account detailed in Goodman’s book, The Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and 
Fall of the CIA, that “the deputy director of the CIA’s Iraqi Task Force noted, ‘Let’s keep in 
mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what Curveball said or didn’t say 
. . . the powers that be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether Curveball knows what 
he’s talking about.’”79 It is clear through this evidence that the direct pressure by the Vice 
President on the CIA and the predetermined policy preferences of the Bush administration 
led to the politicization of intelligence and the Iraq invasion. 
2. Cherry Picking Info 
The second method of influence the Bush administration used to politicize and 
influence the intelligence surrounding the invasion of Iraq was cherry picking.80 Despite 
having multiple analyses from the intelligence community noting the unlikely possibility 
of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction, the administration specifically 
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chose politically preferred intelligence.81 A clear example of the cherry picking of 
intelligence was on display when President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address 
proclaimed the Iraq government had tried to acquire uranium deposits from Niger.82 Not 
only was this intelligence later found to be inaccurate, but George Tenet, knowing the 
intelligence was not reliable, had even tried multiple times to remove it from the speech 
due to its untrustworthiness. In his speech, the President proclaimed that the source was 
British intelligence to prevent backlash on the United States if it was inaccurate. 
Additionally, cherry picking intelligence was easy for the administration because it was 
intentionally asking leading questions such as when the Secretary of Defense asked the 
question “does Saddam have WMD’s?” This direct questioning makes the answer seem 
relatively simple as either yes or no; however, it was much more complicated than that 
when attempting to access probability in answering the question.83 A further discussion of 
the question asking (a separate method of politicizing intelligence) reveals that had the 
question been broader, it would have been more informative and led to a different analysis. 
Cherry picking did not just happen within the Bush administration, however; due 
to direct pressure, it appears that senior officials and the administration ignored analysts 
who were reporting that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction.84 The 
CIA Inspector General never investigated these reports or resolved the issues of the 
politicization. This may be due to the close relationship (depicted in Figure 1) between 
George Tenet and the administration and the fact that intelligence was filtered through the 
bureaucracy of the CIA from the analysts to the administration. As Pillar states,  
The Bush administration would frown on or ignore analysis that called into 
question a decision to go to war and welcome analysis that supported such 
a decision. Intelligence analysts—for whom attention, especially favorable 
attention, from policymakers is a measure of success—felt a strong wing 
consistently blowing in one direction.85 
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Treverton would argue that not only was this a clear example of cherry picking 
politicization but a result of direct pressure from the President’s administration onto the 
IC. The administration supported the evidence that supported their policy preferences and 
eliminated and ousted the analysts that provided contrary analyses. This egregious cherry 
picking of information caused great harm to the IC and to the credibility of both the IC and 
the Bush administration. 
3. Question Asking 
The third way the Bush administration politicized intelligence was by simply 
asking analysts leading questions.86 The framing of a question can in some cases suggest 
a desired outcome. An example, previously mentioned, was when Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld asked the IC, “Does Saddam have WMD?”87 This question not only led 
to a politicized answer but also allowed the answer to be cherry picked, causing a double 
politicization of analysis. The question asked by Rumsfeld made it seem as though there 
was a right or wrong answer and that the analysts must find the right answer. Knowing 
what the administration wanted to hear led the analysts to produce material that only 
reflected the desired answer, which is a textbook example of the influence of direct pressure 
on the analyses.88 As Treverton states, “question asking had a political effect on 
intelligence.”89 The question asked by Secretary Rumsfeld left few options for analysts 
and should have been more broad to allow for a more detailed investigation. 
There are other examples in this case when question asking immediately skewed 
the possible explanation of the questions in one direction. A former CIA employee Vincent 
Cannistraro stated, “If people are ignoring your intelligence, and the Pentagon and the NSC 
keep telling you, ‘What about this? What about this? Keep looking!’—well, then you start 
focusing on one thing instead of the other thing, because you know that’s what your 
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political masters want to hear.”90 There is a direct relation between the forming of a 
question and the answer. Policymakers may have been asking questions and demanding 
answers to ensure every possibility was analyzed before a decision was made. However, in 
this case the administration officials’ questions appear to have only been asked to help 
gather evidence to support a predetermined policy preference. Intelligence became the 
intermediary to connect the issue to the solution and question asking is what allowed the 
administration’s policy to navigate analysis to its desired destination.  
4. Group Think 
The final method that influenced the politicization of intelligence, groupthink, in 
the Iraq case did not necessarily come from within the Bush administration but rather from 
within the intelligence community. Groupthink enabled analysts to incorporate information 
that may not have been as influential if Saddam had not previously had WMDs in the past. 
As Betts notes, “to people paying attention to the issues, the conclusion seemed utterly 
obvious from the accumulated observations and experience of the preceding decade.”91 
The fact that Saddam previously possessed weapons of mass destruction led the IC to 
believe it might be possible again and influenced the analyses years later.92  
Groupthink, based on previous experience, severely influenced the analysis and 
thus the policy recommendations made to the Bush administration. Treverton simplifies 
this by adding, “If most people believe one thing, arguing for another is hard.”93 It becomes 
even harder to avoid groupthink when policymakers agree with the flawed analysis and 
praise it as groundbreaking. The feeling of accomplishing a major task and being policy 
relevant overrides the conditioning and training that analysts have in preventing biased 
influence on analysis. Had analysts looked at more evidence and relied less on previous 
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experiences, it may have prevented or changed the analysis that DCI Tenet gave the 
president.94 
5. Counter Arguments and Iraq Case Summary 
Despite these examples of politicized intelligence leading up to the Iraq invasion, 
there are still many within the intelligence community who think the intelligence failure 
was not the result of politicized intelligence. Lowenthal comments on the accusation of 
politicized intelligence in the invasion of Iraq and states,  
The Senate Intelligence Committee found that groupthink was a major 
problem in the Iraq analysis, along with a failure to examine previously help 
premises. At the same time, the committee found no evidence that the 
intelligence had been politicized. The WMD Commission (formally the 
Commission on the intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction), established by President George W. Bush, 
came to the same conclusion regarding politicization but was critical about 
how the intelligence community handled both collection and analysis on 
Iraq WMD and on other issues.95 
Lowenthal, the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the WMD Commission appear 
to believe that groupthink is not a form of politicized intelligence. Despite this opinion, 
this incident could have been avoided had the intelligence community pushed back on the 
demands of the administration and had Director Tenet had more separation from the 
President, the Secretary of State, and other senior officials. It is the responsibility of the IC 
leadership to prevent politicized question asking to ensure bias does not infiltrate the purity 
of intelligence analyses. 
Another counterargument is that the expectations of intelligence are too great and 
that failure comes with the job.96 The Iraq case is just one example of a circumstance where 
the CIA overextended itself and failed to prevent politicized intelligence. Intelligence is not 
fail proof or perfect. It is apparent, however, using this idea that the IC is infallible has led 
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the community to become the scapegoat for failed policy, something reform will not be able 
to change. The theory that the IC knows all is an assumption that will only lead to 
disappointment.  
In this case, however, the expectations of the IC were not too high. This is not a 
case of missed intelligence but rather politicized intelligence. Many inside the CIA have 
given accounts of the politicization of intelligence and in some circumstances even 
attempted to stop it. The problem was that Director Tenet was too close to the 
administration, had no professional intelligence experience besides serving as a staffer on 
the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, and failed to prevent the Iraq invasion. Despite 
the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate, not only did Hussein not possess WMD’s but he 
also was never found to have support Al Qaeda, which were the two reasons the 
administration justified the war.97 
Not all cases of intelligence politicization are limited to the IC or fit into 
Treverton’s method of categorizing the reasons for politicized intelligence. After the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, the absence of a strong 
central government created a void that was filled by a new Islamic extremist group 
commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This new group 
exploited the lack of a strong government in Syria and Iraq and used the territory as a safe 
haven for training and operations in the region to form a new Caliphate and independent 
Islamic State. The rise of ISIS came as a surprise to many citizens as they watched Fallujah 
and Mosul fall back into the control of extremists in 2014.98 How could this happen? 
Where was the IC’s analysis and estimates? Although this case is considered an intelligence 
failure, it differs from other cases because the failure was not merely politicization of 
intelligence analysis but rather a manipulation of intelligence because of political pressure 
after analysis was conducted. Regardless of the causal factors, the rise of ISIS is still an 
intelligence failure worth investigating. Despite the fact that some investigations are still 
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ongoing, this thesis attempted to find the motivation behind the politicized intelligence 
using Treverton’s method. 
B. WAS THE RISE OF ISIS UNANTICIPATED? 
Politicized intelligence can influence Defense Department intelligence just as it has 
in the IC. The IC is not the only source of intelligence for policymakers; in fact, many in 
the military work in or with the IC. President Obama ran in and won the 2004 election in 
part because of the negative views of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sebastian 
Gorka, a professor at the Marine Corps University, stated in an interview with the 
Washington Times, “This administration is ideologically wedded to the narrative that 
Afghanistan was the ‘good’ war and Iraq the ‘bad’ war since this is the platform that got 
the president elected originally.”99 After the withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the 
administration was not interested in combating the rising threat of the Islamic State in Iraq 
(ISI, which would become ISIS in 2013) with kinetic ground forces.100 Not only would 
this be politically costly, but it would also be expensive for the government and ultimately 
the taxpayers. This policy was known to many, both in and outside the administration, and 
likely had an effect on the analysis in CENTCOM’s intelligence. 
The controversy in this case is whether senior intelligence officials within 
CENTCOM altered the estimates made by analysts in order to provide an analysis that was 
more positive than others within the IC were reporting.101 When looking at this case, one 
might wonder, why would senior civilians and military commanders manipulate and 
politicize intelligence? Using Treverton’s model, it is apparent that direct pressure because 
of policy preferences and direct pressure because of military relationships led to politicized 
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intelligence. Additionally, the can do attitude that can be correlated to the house line 
category of politicization also caused the failure to assess the capability of ISIS forces. 
1. Direct Pressure because of Policy Preferences 
The first cause of politicized intelligence in CENTCOM analysis is direct pressure. 
Senior military officers knew the policy of the current administration and might have been 
fearful of reporting a less than optimistic analysis on the rising threat of ISIS to the White 
House.102 Knowing what senior military officers knew about the current policy and that 
Washington would judge their effectiveness on their ability to combat the issue, it is not 
unreasonable that officials would paint a rosier picture of the problems in their area of 
responsibility.103 Their careers and their superiors’ careers may have depended on the 
optimistic reporting. 
2. Direct Pressure because of the Chain of Command Relationship 
A second reason senior CENTCOM intelligence officials might have manipulated 
intelligence is because of the chain of command relationship, which makes it difficult for 
a subordinate of the Combatant Commander, in this case General Lloyd Austin, to criticize 
their supervisor’s work in their region.104 Imagine a job where the subordinate would rate 
or determine the efficiency of their superior, which their superior would not only receive 
but also forward to the President of the United States. This in of itself makes the job of the 
military intelligence leaders extremely difficult. In short, if the intelligence is not 
optimistic, analysts are expected to report it regardless of their bias towards the operations 
and their superiors’ thinking. It is a tough situation to be placed in regardless of one’s 
profession but is drastically more difficult in military culture, which is based on structured 
leadership.  
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3. House Lines or “Can Do” Attitude 
The third type of politicization in the ISIS case may be just an organizational flaw 
within the military. The ‘can do’ attitude of many within the military often undermines the 
difficulty of a task. This ‘can do’ attitude can be correlated to Treverton’s example of house 
lines. Although it is not a political stance, the military does indeed have a can do attitude 
that is preached within the organization, almost becoming a “house line.” In this case, the 
failure to appreciate the strategy of the enemy may have led to not only faulty analysis but 
also the unexpected rise of ISIS. Although this is less of a politicization of intelligence and 
more a failure to divulge a commander’s weakness, it led to a major intelligence failure by 
policymakers failing to act prior to the rise of a major threat to U.S. national security 
because of manipulated intelligence. 
After a thorough investigation, it became clear that politicization did occur. A 
House of Representatives Joint Task Force concluded that Maj. Gen. Steven Grove and his 
civilian deputy Gregory Ryckman manipulated the estimates of the rise of ISIS.105 Mr. 
Gregory Hooker, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst, initially blew the whistle 
and reported numerous cases of the manipulation of intelligence by both Gen. Grove and 
Ryckman.106 Thus, far, neither Gen. Grove nor Ryckman have been held accountable for 
their actions.107 Although the motive may not be clear yet, the analysis above provides 
countless reasons why these two individuals manipulated intelligence. The Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) Inspector General’s investigation concluded that there were failures in 
the CENTCOM intelligence command but that there was not politicization of intelligence. 
The evidence seems to support the contrary.108 Just like senior CENTCOM officials might 
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have a bias, so might the DoD’s Inspector General when assessing the ability of one their 
own Combatant Commanders in this case. It may be unrealistic to assume the Inspector 
General would lie in his report; however, it directly contradicts what the House found in 
its investigation. 
The Obama administration’s foreign policy preferences at the time indirectly 
caused the politicization in the ISIS case based on, command bias (house line), and possibly 
because of the lesson learned from the previous CENTCOM Commander, General Mattis, 
who ultimately disagreed with the President’s administration policy preferences. General 
Austin did not want to follow in his predecessors’ footsteps and wanted to avoid conflict 
with the Obama administration. Regardless of the reasons for politicization, it is irrelevant. 
Motive is not important in the politicization of intelligence; what is important is that 
intelligence is analytically honest and allows policy makers to make informed decisions.109 
C. CONCLUSION 
In both cases presented in this chapter, politicized intelligence led to extreme loss 
of life, caused taxpayers billions of dollars, and made for poor foreign policy. The most 
significant aspect of these case studies is that if politicized intelligence was thwarted by 
candid leaders these cases would be preventable. The intelligence branches of both the CIA 
and the CENTCOM intelligence commander primarily caused the Iraq WMD failure and 
the ISIS CENTCOM fiasco because they were too close to their superiors and to the policy 
that dictated the foreign relations and strategic vision of each President’s administration. 
The producers of intelligence in both cases were subjected to policy preferences and limited 
their work to the confines of what was deemed acceptable by the Executive Branch. The 
question that this thesis intends to answer, now that it has demonstrated that politicization 
exists and negatively impacts U.S. national interest, is: can politicization be prevented in 
the future or will Americans be forced to deal with the imperfections of the IC? 
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IV. CURRENT LIMITS ON POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS 
The previous chapter, through the analysis of its two case studies, completed three 
of the four main objectives of this thesis. The first objective was to prove that intelligence 
does get politicized in the intelligence community and the Defense Department. The next 
objective was to demonstrate the negative impact that politicization has regarding policy 
decisions, the integrity of the IC, and the lives of many citizens of the United States. 
Finally, the previous chapters determined that the source of the politicized intelligence is 
the relationship of the top managers of producers of intelligence when they are too close to 
the consumers—often the executive branch—and fail to provide intelligence that is 
“objective, independent of political considerations … and employ[ed] the standards of 
proper analytic tradecraft.”110  
This chapter aims to investigate what reform might look like to address the issue of 
politicization. The chapter looks at other positions in the Executive Branch of government 
that are political appointments and determines possible solutions to the appointment 
requirements of IC leaders. Specifically, the chapter asserts that term limits and requiring 
the senior appointees to hold credentials or records of service in the IC should be 
prerequisites to being authorized to lead the community.  
This portion of the thesis studies the requirements to become the Director of the 
FBI, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the FEMA Director, and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve to see if those requirements could solve the issues 
discovered in the previous chapter of this thesis. Finally, this chapter concludes by looking 
at the Director of National Intelligence position to determine if those who held that new 
position were more successful with intelligence backgrounds. 
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A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
From 1924 until 1972, J. Edgar Hoover led the FBI as its director.111 For 48 years, 
he ruled the agency despite the Senate never confirming him.112 Since then, Congress 
established 28 United States Code (U.S.C.) §532, which limits the term of the Director of 
the FBI to ten years and also requires FBI Director appointees to be Senate-vetted before 
assuming office.113 
Congress created the new law for two main reasons. First, Congress believed that 
being involved in the confirmation process would give the legislative branch more control 
over the FBI’s vast size, which had greatly increased during Hoover’s reign. Secondly, the 
new law was created to ensure that the FBI remained unbiased and apolitical. The failed 
nomination of L. Patrick Gray III, as the Congressional Research Service noted, states, 
“Senators expressed concern about partisanship, lack of independence from the White 
House, and poor handling of the Watergate investigation.”114 L. Patrick Gray III was the 
first nominee as the Director of the FBI after 28U.S.C. §532 was enacted, and Congress 
was concerned about the obvious close relationship of the President and the Director. 
During his Senate confirmation hearing, the first for an FBI director, several Senators cited 
the same argument in this thesis, that leaders of independent government agencies must 
remain apolitical and unbiased.115  
The FBI Director requirements as a model to reduce politicization has ensured those 
who hold the position, like IC leaders, should be partisan and should operate independently 
from the White House. The CIA was developed as a non-departmental agency to reduce 
politicization just like the FBI director has the requirements for term length and Senate 
confirmation. Until recently, the new law appeared to uphold its intent to ensure politics 
did not undermine the mission of the Director of the FBI. Thus, term limits, although not 
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currently required for IC positions, could become an integral part of new reform in the IC 
to reduce politicization. 
B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves at the pleasure of the 
President to assist and advise on policy as it relates to the military.116 10 U.S. Code § 152 
provides the legal requirements to serve as the CJCS in detail. According to the law, there 
are three basic requirements. First, the Chairman must be presidentially appointed and 
Senate-confirmed. Secondly, the CJCS must have “previously served as the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), or as a unified or specified combatant commander, 
or as the head of a branch of service (i.e., the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps).”117 Finally, the CJCS, once confirmed, may only serve three consecutive two years 
terms unless otherwise directed by the President in a time of war.118 
There are a number of reasons for these particular requirements. The first 
requirement is to ensure Congress maintains oversight of the civilian-military relationship 
particularly to vet the CJCS in order to guarantee their unbiased and apolitical influence 
within the executive branch. The second requirement ensures that the CJCS has the 
requisite knowledge and experience in joint operations to effectively advise the President. 
As noted by Peter Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke, “the chairman is the 
principal adviser to the president and to the other national security policy makers. He’s not 
directly in the chain of command, but all of the reporting up the chain of command travels 
through him, through the secretary of Defense, to the president of the United States.”119 
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Third, the term limit ensures that no individual CJCS stays in that role over a long period 
of time and may therefore develop a political relationship to the executive administration.  
Although many IC leadership positions have the same requirement as the CJCS for 
Senate confirmation they do not have the requirements to have professional experience or 
term limits to prevent political relationships from developing overtime ultimately leading 
to the politicization of information. As discussed throughout this thesis, these second two 
requirements and the reasons for their existence are very similar to the requirements that 
should be instituted in the IC. The CJCS is an advisor to the President just as the DCIA and 
the DNI and is nominated to ensure there is trust and confidence in the relationship, but in 
the CJCS there are requirements in place to ensure the relationship does not lead to 
misinformed policy and possible failures, which are missing for IC leadership.  
C. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY DIRECTOR 
Hurricane Katrina caused over 1,600 fatalities and damage costs that exceeded 
$100 billion. In response to the scale of the disaster and the failures of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond swiftly, Congress in 2006 enacted 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.120 This Act specifically 
established for the first time “the role, qualifications, authority, and responsibilities of the 
Administrator of FEMA.”121 
The most consequential reform from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act changed the requirements to serve as the Director of FEMA. One of the primary 
findings in the multiple Hurricane Katrina investigations conducted by Congress was that the 
leadership within FEMA did not possess the education and experience to serve in their roles 
at the time of the incident.122 Specifically, the then Director Michael Brown was criticized 
because he had been a lawyer and horse judge prior to being appointed as the nation’s 
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primary emergency manager.123 Shortly after Katrina, Brown stepped down as director amid 
substantial uproar by the citizens of the Gulf States, Congress, and the media.124 
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act directly addressed the 
primary finding that FEMA Director Brown was ill-equipped to serve in his position. It 
states, as a solution, that the Director of FEMA shall “have not less than five years of 
executive leadership and management experience, significant experience in crisis 
management or another relevant field, and a demonstrated ability to manage a substantial 
staff and budget.”125 From now on, only someone with experience in crises/emergency 
management will serve as the Director of FEMA without a term limit because of the non-
political nature of the position. The idea that the leader of an organization should have 
basic knowledge of the organizations’ profession does not seem unreasonable and might 
become a necessity for future IC leadership. 
D. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is charged with leading and 
monitoring the U.S. central bank, setting interest rates, controlling the money supply, 
setting monetary policy, and controlling inflations in an attempt to reduce 
unemployment.126 Political party preferences can obviously affect the responsibilities of 
the Federal Reserve and the Board of Governors. To reduce the influence of the president 
and politics, the Board was set up so that no president or political party could control and 
appoint the entire board upon an election.127  
Currently, there are seven members of the board each serving 14 year terms. Every 
two years the president appoints and the Senate confirms a new member of the Board.128 
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In addition to the new appointments every two years, the president appoints the Chairman 
and two Vice Chairman of the Board from within the current members of the Board to four 
year terms.129 These appointments ensure that the president gets to appoint someone with 
their economic preferences without gaining total control of the board.  
Like in the intelligence community, the Chairman and the Vice Chairmen of the 
Board of the Federal Reserve are able to ensure that they and the rest of the board have the 
administration’s preferences in mind while still remaining independent. As Paul Pillar notes, 
the “long and fixed term” of the Board of the Federal Reserve makes it an interesting model 
for comparison when considering the issues of politicization within the intelligence 
community.130  
The Board positions’ term limits and the requirement that appointees shall have 
“demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising community banks having less 
than $10 billion in total assets” makes this appointment structure a great example for the IC 
to follow.131 The last requirement for Board members to have experience is less about the 
impartiality of the board and more driven to ensure the board has the requisite knowledge of 
the finance community to best serve the people of the United States. The Board of the Federal 
Reserve serves the administration well by being impartial, having sufficient professional 
experience, and installing term limits to prevent its own politicization.  
E. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 
reorganized the IC and established the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
hoping to seamlessly integrate and coordinate the 16 agencies within the IC.132 The DNI 
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now serves as the chief and direct representative of the IC to the President.133Additionally, 
the IRTPA created a Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence to assist the DNI 
in their duties of leading the IC. 
In accordance with IRTPA, the DNI or the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence is required to “be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, in active status; 
or have, by training or experience, and appreciation of military intelligence activities and 
requirements.”134 Additionally, the law requires that the DNI also have “extensive national 
security expertise.”135 To date, the DNI and the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence are the only leaders within the IC that have specific requirements for 
confirmation by the Senate.  
However, despite these requirements, the current DNI, former Senator Daniel Coats, 
does not meet the criteria to have “extensive national security expertise.”136 Senator Coats 
has served the United States honorably as a Congressman, Ambassador to Germany, and 
Senator but does not possess the national security experience that the IRTPA intended to 
require in the spirit of the law. As Spencer Ackerman notes, “Coats is the first DNI nominee 
not to come from either the professional military, intelligence community or diplomatic 
service. He seeks to step into his role at a fraught time for U.S. intelligence after being on the 
sidelines as Trump’s early national security policies and priorities have coalesced.”137 There 
have been previous DNI’s that have met the criteria of the IRTPA requirements by serving 
as military intelligence officers, CIA officers, and leaders of IC agencies. In sum, it appears 
those with thorough experience in the IC have served the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence well, the requirement to have “extensive national security expertise” should 
remain and presidents and the Senate should adhere to these legal requirements. 
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The intelligence community has been under scrutiny since 9/11 and the WMD 
intelligence failure, and despite the government’s best efforts to reform, politicization 
remains.138 There are numerous Presidential appointments within the government that 
have requirements to ensure the appointees have the expertise, education, experience, and 
training needed to best serve the citizens of the United States. Some appointments even 
have longer term limits to prevent politicization and influence by sitting Presidents. Table 
1 denotes the three general requirements—professional experience, Senate confirmation, 
and term limits—for each position described in this chapter and makes it apparent that there 
is a lack of oversight or control over positions in the IC. 








Board of Federal Reserve X X X 
 




 X X 
 
CJCS X X X 
 
DNI  X  
 
CIA Director  X  
 
The next chapter of this thesis recommends reform to overcome politicization using 
some of the models of the political appointments described in this chapter. Reform is often 
considered a dirty word in the IC; however, looking at the evidence, it is a necessity. 
Additionally, the next chapter accomplishes the final goal of the thesis: determining the best 
course of action, or reform, to reduce the politicization of intelligence in the future. 
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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Despite the best efforts of the 9/11 Commission, the WMD Commission and the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the age old problem of 
politicization in the intelligence community has continued.139 Real reform must address 
the issue of politicization within the Intelligence Community to ensure repetitive mistakes 
are avoided and American service members do not continue to die in vain. Like other 
political appointments addressed in Chapter IV, requirements for term length and 
professional expertise could lead to better leadership in the IC in general and prevent 
politicization by the highest leaders of the IC. 
This thesis has made it evident that political bias has been included in U.S. 
intelligence analysis, which has undermined the apolitical principles of the Intelligence 
Community. Additionally, the thesis has proven that IC leaders have not prevented 
politicization because of their close relationship with presidential administrations. This 
chapter in particular answers the last question proposed in the original problem statement: 
how can the U.S. government eliminate politicization? In order to reduce politicization, 
intelligence leaders should be chosen based on professional experience similar to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and should be given fixed terms like the FBI director. 
A. WHAT REFORM SHOULD LOOK LIKE 
Many intelligence experts have noted that reform is a dirty word with negative 
connotations in the intelligence community. Reform often leads to increased bureaucracy, 
ultimately causing less time to actually accomplish the task at hand. Additionally, reform 
usually comes from outside agencies without foresight or experience within the agency to 
implement effective change. Despite these arguments against reform, this thesis still 
provides recommendations to the IC to decrease the political influence on intelligence, 
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something most analysts would consider a worthwhile investment. One of the many 
reasons this thesis recommends reform is because it is a foundational principle of 
democracy. As Andrew Jackson, the seventh president of the United States, noted, 
“Democracy shows not only its power in reforming governments, but in regenerating a race 
of men and this is the greatest blessing of free governments.”140 A democracy or republic 
should never be satisfied with the status quo but should always challenge assumptions to 
make itself more prosperous and righteous. Reform is not always perfect, and strong 
organizations often oppose change, but it is a necessity to ensure organizations always 
improve and transcend the status quo. 
1. Term Length 
The length of a term of office, when it spans greater than the length of a two term 
president, would reduce the likelihood that presidents would be able to exert political 
pressure on appointees. This thesis has argued that George Tenet was too close the Bush 
administration which lead to the politicization of the intelligence in support of the Iraq 
War. In spite of the fact that it may have been unintentional, the politicization of the 
intelligence drastically affected the nation’s trust in the IC. Like in the ISIS case study, 
DCI Tenet probably felt pressure to ensure he met the expectation of the president 
considering he could be fired without warning if he did not meet the expectations of the 
president.  
There are several benefits of creating term limits for IC leadership including 
reducing political pressure on IC leadership, reducing turnover in senior positions, and 
increasing the credibility of the IC. The first benefit of expanding the length of term of IC 
leaders would be that a term limit would reduce the possible pressure of the leadership to 
please the president. Instead of worrying whether intelligence supports policy preferences, 
the IC could focus on providing factual unbiased analysis regardless of preferences. This 
unbiased analysis is the foundation of the IC to begin with. By alleviating the pressure of 
serving the “boss,” the IC leadership would focus on its core mission instead of worrying 
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about job security. Although the IC supports the president in his/her decision making 
process, it should not feel required to please him/her in support of their policy. The IC can 
be objective and still support the president, but could not be objective and still aim to please 
the president because the IC must be able to tell the president facts even though they might 
not like them. 
Secondly, expanding the length of term of the IC leaders would create an 
environment where turnover would not be so abrupt. Instead of having new IC leadership 
every election cycle, IC leadership could actually spend a copious amount of time in their 
position. The experience gained during their tenure in their role will allowing them to gain 
insight and ability to increase performance.  
The final benefit of a long term length is that the IC would increase its credibility. 
Since the Iraq and ISIS IC debacles, the IC appears to have lost its trustworthiness among 
the population. Allowing IC leaders to work in their position through multiple 
administrations would ensure they remain politically and would only increase the 
credibility of the IC. Additionally, longer term limits would foster a greater relationship 
between the producers and consumers of intelligence because of familiarity and trust 
between parties. If the government wants to prevent future IC crises similar to the Iraq 
WMD case, it needs to reform the leadership within the IC to ensure the term length is 
similar to that of the FBI Director and the Board of the Federal Reserve. 
2. Professional Expertise 
Professional expertise is the second critical piece to reforming the IC and guarding 
it from politicization. Professional leadership has driven appointments of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Board of the Federal Reserve and the Director of FEMA. The inherent 
complexity of these jobs has forced legislation to ensure leadership possesses the qualities 
and talent to successfully lead these organizations. The IC is no different in its complexity. 
Foreign intelligence, covert action, counter intelligence, analysis, human intelligence, 
signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measures and signals intelligence, and open 
source intelligence are all complex missions that without guided and knowledgeable 
leadership could lead to intelligence failure. 
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To prevent pending intelligence failure, Congress should pass reform similar to that 
passed in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act to regulate the 
requirements to serve as both the DCIA and the DNI. It should state, similarly to the Post- 
Katrina Act, that the DCIA and the DNI shall “have not less than five years of executive 
leadership and management experience, significant experience” in the intelligence 
community, and a “demonstrated ability to manage a substantial staff and budget.”141  
Ultimately, the requirement for professional experience would serve two purposes. 
The first purpose would be to maintain the professionalism and reputation of the 
organization as an apolitical unbiased organization. Having a professional appointee would 
not only appear to make the position less political but would also increase the confidence 
of subordinates that the IC leadership has the community and its people in its best interests, 
not political preferences. Additionally, as a professional appointee the leadership would 
know where the line between IC and policymaker should be drawn and would be more 
likely to enforce it based on experience and knowledge. 
The second purpose of the professional appointment would be similar to the 
purpose of political appointments. Although there would be new requirements for senior 
leadership in the IC, they would still serve at the pleasure of the President. This would 
ensure that the policymaker and intelligence nexus remained intact, allowing intelligence 
to be policy relevant. This reform would not take away the power of the President to 
appoint or terminate IC leadership but rather ensure their appointees have the knowledge 
to best serve the government and ultimately the American people. The President should 
still, under certain parameters, be able to relieve IC leadership. As an example if an IC 
leader had been found guilty of a crime, then they would be relieved. This would only be 
in extreme circumstances and in all other circumstances the term limit would remain a law. 
Creating a professional requirement for IC leadership could also create a greater 
separation between producers and consumers. This would likely happen because IC 
leadership would be seen as independent from the president’s inner circle because its 
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leaders would not be loyal to the administration’s political agenda. This could negatively 
affect the IC, and despite making it less likely that politicization would occur, it would also 
be tough to ensure intelligence is policy relevant. However, if IC leaders are able to gain 
trust from administrations through sound and unbiased intelligence, then the gap between 
the producers and consumers could be surmounted. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are two areas in the study of politicized intelligence that could strengthen the 
argument presented in this thesis. The first area where additional research could be 
dedicated is in a metric to compare the effectiveness of political appointees and 
professional appointees. The second area of study would be a more analytical method to 
analyze leadership, specifically in the field of intelligence community leadership. 
1. Political vs. Professional Appointments Metric 
Despite new legislation that would require political appointees to have professional 
experience, there is no analytical proof that appointees with more experience perform better 
than those who do not. This thesis has argued empirically that it is common sense that 
professional appointees would have a better understanding of their positions and would be 
likely to outperform those who do not, but future research should try to find an analytical 
model to prove this assumption. Realistically, the best model would be a position where 
both political appointees and professionals work as is the case for ambassadors from the 
State Department. If a model could assess what success might be as an ambassador and 
compare the success rates between professionals and political appointees, it could greatly 
strengthen or weaken the argument presented in this thesis. If professional appointees 
performed better than political appointees, it would support the argument presented in this 
thesis that professionals are more effective in complexed leadership roles. However, if 
political appointees outperformed professional ambassadors, it could mean that leadership 
in positions is not always based on professional experience but rather the individual 
qualities of leaders. 
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2. How to Determine Success of Leadership 
Determining the success of political and professional appointments would not be 
easy. How do you define success in the IC? There is a metric in the military that does assess 
command climate, which is usually a direct reflection of how leadership is performing as 
assessed by subordinates. In the case of determining success, this model might be useful in 
the IC and could be used to help leadership perceive their success and work to improve. In 
the IC, like the military, the juniors in the organization do most of the hands on and difficult 
work and have a unique view point as to whether the organization and its leadership are 
operating effectively. This metric could allow for a comparison between professionally and 
politically appointed leaders. The results could greatly strengthen or hinder (depending on 
the results) the argument presented within this thesis. 
C. DEPARTING REMARKS 
To conclude, this thesis has demonstrated that politicization exists in the current 
structure of the Intelligence Community and negatively impacts national security. In the 
case study analyses of the Iraq WMD case and the rise of ISIS case, politicization has been 
the major contributing factor in their intelligence failures. In the first case, politicization 
caused a preemptive war on a sovereign land based on false information. In the second 
case, the Department of Defense failed to realize the critical implications of the rise of ISIS 
because of modified and politicized intelligence. However, both cases, as discussed 
earlier—although the first resulted in action, and the second resulted in inaction—led to 
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines losing their lives in combat.  
This thesis has also argued that reform can alleviate politicization. If the 
government acts to increase the term limits of IC leadership and requires appointees to 
have requisite knowledge of the institutions that they are entrusted to lead, then 
politicization will be easier to identify, isolate, and remove from intelligence analysis. 
Reform will not only make the IC better prepared in the future to counteract political bias 
but will also ensure the IC remains creditable in the executive and legislative branches of 
government and in the minds of the citizens of this great nation. 
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